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NOTES

OF MICE AND 'MANIMAL': THE PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE'S LATEST STANCE
AGAINST PATENT PROTECTION FOR HUMANBASED INVENTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has witnessed incredible technological advances in
such fields as transportation, medicine, and everyday consumer goods.
Historically, these technological advances have challenged judges and
legislators alike because they greatly affect the legal system. In order to
appreciate legal changes spurred by technology, one need only consider the
impact on tort law of the railroad and the automobile, or the shift toward
strict products liability accompanying the increase "mmass-produced goods.
However, no area of the law has been as directly impacted by technological
advances as patent law.
The United States patent system awards limited protection to inventors
who expend considerable time and effort in perfecting their creations.
Nonetheless, at least one group of inventors on the cutting edge of
technology is currently denied this protection. These inventors are
biotechnologists involved in creating human-based inventions.
Biotechnology has been defined as the science of molecular biology
implemented in an effort to utilize naturally-occurring processes in new and
useful ways. 1
During the last quarter century, terrific strides have been made in the area
of biotechnology. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)

' Dan L. Burk, Biotechnologyand PatentLaw:FittingInnovationto the ProcrusteanBed, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1991).
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has awarded, albeit reluctantly,2 patents for genetically-engineered products
and processes, including multicellular animals.' However, the PTO has
made it quite clear that it will not grant a patent for a "human multicellular
living organism. " '
In a 1987 announcement,' the PTO lifted the ban on multicellular animal
patents, but it simultaneously stated that "[a] claim directed to or including
within its scope a human being will not be considered a patentable subject." 6
While the statement does lift the ban on multicellular animals, it creates a
barrier to human-based patents by stating that claims directed toward a
nonplant, multicellular organism must be "non-human."7
The PTO's initial reasoning for precluding the issuance of patents for
"human-based bioproducts" rested on two prongs: (1)its interpretation of the
Patent Act and (2) its reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment as prohibiting
the issuance of human-based patents! More recently, the PTO has released
a statement indicating that it might deny a patent application involving
humans based on public policy and morality aspects of the utility
requirement of the Patent Act.9
This statement was allegedly issued by the PTO in response to a joint
patent application filed by New York cellular biologist Stuart Newman and
Jeremy Rifkin, president of the Foundation on Economic Trends."0 The

2 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980) (reversing PTO's
denial of patent application for oil-spill-eating bacteria).
See U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988) (granting a patent for Transgenic Non-Human
Mammals).
' DonaldJ. Quigg, Policy Announcement by Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, in 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.Soc'y 328 (1987) (announcing that the PTO would
thereafter consider "non-naturally occurring, non-human, multicellular organisms" to be patentable subject
matter).
sId.
6

Id

7Id.
8 Alan R. Geraldi, Comment, In His Image: On PatentingHuman-Based Bioproducts, 25 U.S.F. L.
REV. 583, 584 (1991).
' DonaldJ. Quigg, Media Advisory Statement by Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, in Patent and Trademark Office Issues Statement on Patentingof PartialHuman Life
Forms, 10 No. 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 17 (1998).
0 Incidentally, neither man truly wants the patent application to be granted. Instead, they support
the PTO's guidelines regarding human-based inventions and would prefer to strengthen the bar to such
patent protection by having their application denied. In fact, Jeremy Rifkin has battled against genetic
patents for years, stating that "these patents are the greatest legal scam of the 20th century." Joan 0.
Hamilton, Get a Life, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1996, 39, 79. The fact that the two applicants support a denial of
the patent raises the interesting issue of whether they would appeal a denial in order to get a decision from
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application claims a technique for combining human and animal embryo
cells to produce a single human/non-human chimera. " "A chimera is a type
of being or organism, organ or part thereof, consisting of tissues of diverse
genetic constitution."12 The genetic composite is created by combining
portions of embryos from two closely-related species or varieties within a
species." The resulting organism contains DNA from both species. 4
This Note will attempt to address the PTO's former and current stance
against the patentability of human-based inventions. It will examine the
rationale behind the PTO's positions and determine whether the latest
statement is a retreat from the former announcement or a mere refinement.
Part II will provide a brief overview of United States patent law. Part Imwill
provide a chronological history of "living patents" including plant, single
cell, and multicellular animal patents. Part IV will consider the changes in
the status of the patentability of human-based inventions, if any, which have
resulted from the PTO's latest statement as well as examine the arguments
for and against the recognition of patents for human-based inventions.
1"[.
THE MECHANICS OF THE PATENT PROCESS

Patents for "living inventions" have come slowly and with great
reluctance from the PTO.
The PTO's current reaction to the
Newman/Rifkin patent application is yet another example of an inventor
pushing the envelope of biotechnology only to be slowed by the
apprehension of the PTO to recognize certain forms of "living inventions."
The PTO's former and current stance against these inventions can only be
understood after a brief overview of the origins and the requirements of
United States patent law.

the courts. An appeal would be quite risky because, as this Note will point out, the PTO guidelines in
this area seem to contradict the strong and unambiguous language of the United States Supreme Court
in Diamondv. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
n "Morality" Aspect of Utility Requirement Can Bar Patentfor Part-HumanInventions, 55 PAT.
TRADEMARK &COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 555 (1998).
12 Quigg, supra note 9, at 17. "The word chimera is derived from a monster in Greek mythology

having a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail." Id.
13Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Towarda General Theory ofConstitutionalPersonhoodA Theory of
ConstitutionalPersonhoodfor Transgenic HumanoidSpecies, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1436 (1992).
14

Id
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A. THE ORIGINS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW

The Constitution gives Congress legislative authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.""5 One of the purposes of this constitutional provision is to
provide incentive for a potential inventor to put forth the capital and time
needed to advance his field of expertise. Thomas Jefferson, the author of the
first Patent Act, noted that "ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement," which could be accomplished by granting inventors a
temporary monopoly over their inventions. 6
Under current patent law, an inventor may exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention for twenty years from the date of filing. 1
During this period, the owner of the patent is able to exploit the invention,
reaping a return on his intellectual and financial investment. In return for
this limited monopoly, the inventor must completely disclose his
invention, 8 thus allowing the public to improve upon or augment it.
B. THE UNITED STATES PATENT ACT

The current Patent Act states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 9 The requirements
for patentability are novelty," nonobviousness, 2' and utility.22

U.S. CONST. art I, S 8, cl.
8.
16

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807) in 11 WRITINGS OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON 200, 201-02 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass'n 1904)

(1853).
1135 U.S.C. S 154 (1994).
18 See 35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994) (providing the enabling disclosure requirement); see also 3 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS S 7.01 (1994) (comparing the disclosure requirement to a quid pro quo
between the inventor and the government). This statutory provision is known as the enabling disclosure
requirement because the disclosure enables other would-be inventors to produce the invention and to
change the process enough to obtain their own patent, thus leading to scientific advancement.
19 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1994).

oId S 102.
1 35 U.S.C. S 103 (1994 & Supp. M1 1997).
2 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1994).
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The novelty provision of the Patent Act requires that a patentable
invention be new at the time of its discovery and that its inventor was the
one who actually conceived of the invention and reduced it to practice.23 It
does not matter if someone creates something in good faith, believing that
it has not been invented before; if the invention is already patented, the
subsequent "inventor" has no rights under the Patent Act. 4
The nonobviousness provision of the Act requires that a patentable
invention must not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art or field to which the invention pertains.2
The test for
nonobviousness requires two determinations: (1)the scope of "prior art" and
the level of ordinary skill in the inventor's field and (2) whether the
invention would have been obvious to someone with ordinary skill in light
of the prior art.26 Due to the inherent difficulty of this test, courts have
formulated alternative methods through which an inventor may satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement.27
In order for an invention to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C.
101, it must have a significant use.2" In order for an invention to be useful,
it must be operative for a purpose set forth in the patent application.29
Commercial success is not a requirement to prove operability or the broader
concept of utility.3"
For the purposes of this Note, the most important aspect of the utility
requirement is the so-called "morality" standard. In its April 1998 press
release concerning Newman's patent application, the PTO relied on this
morality standard in asserting its reluctance to grant the patent. A more in23 Id

S 102.

24 laj
25

35 U.S.C. S 103 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).

26

See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: CASES,

MATERIALS AND NOTES ON UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS

862 (4th ed. 1989) (labeling "prior art" as a term of art including both actual knowledge of one skilled in
the field as well as constructive knowledge of particular documents and events).
' Karen F. Lech, Note, Human Genes Without Functions: Biotechnology Tests the Patent Utility
Standard,27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1631, 1639-40 (1993); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966) (listing secondary considerations such as commercial success
and failure of others).
23 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-34, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 693-95 (1966).
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 794, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affid 611
F.2d 156, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 803 (6th Cir. 1979).
30 See generally Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Co., 688 F. Supp. 206,214, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1897, 1903 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting, however, that commercial success can be compelling evidence
of operability).
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depth analysis of the morality standard of the utility requirement will
therefore be provided in Part mH along with a discussion of the present status
of the patentability of human-based inventions.
C. THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM

In order to appreciate the importance (or lack thereof) of the PTO's
stance against "human inventions," one must understand an inventor's
procedural rights following the denial of a patent application.
Initially, a patent application is filed with the PTO; there the decision
whether to grant the patent rests with one of the PTO's examiners. If the
inventor is dissatisfied with the denial of his patent, he may appeal the
decision to an administrative review board and the Board of Patent Appeals
(the Board).3 Denials by the Board may subsequently be reviewed by a
federal district court, whose decision may be reviewed all the way to the
United States Supreme Court. 2 "[P]rior to the organization of the Federal
Circuit, patent decisions were appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.)."33
A denial by the PTO is certainly not a death sentence for an inventor.
Time and time again, the PTO has denied a patent application only to have
the Board or a federal court reverse the denial. One area in which courts
have repeatedly reversed PTO decisions has been that of "living patents."
I. THE HISTORY OF "LIVING PATENTS"

The first "living patent" is widely considered to be that granted in the
3 4 However,
landmark 1980 Supreme Court case of Diamondv. Chakrabarty.
a patent was issued to Louis Pasteur in 187335 claiming a yeast, free from
organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture.36 This suggests that
Chakrabarty's 1980 patent was not the first granted for a living organism.

31

35 U.S.C. SS 7(b), 134 (1994).

32 35 U.S.C. S 141 (1994).
33 Burk, supra note 1, at 26 n.156.

447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
U.S. Pat. No. 141,072 (May 9, 1873).
36 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314 n.9, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 201 n.9 (indicating that the Court's
grant of a patent for a living organism was nothing new).
'
3"
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Pasteur's yeast patent, however, was a rare example of the PTO granting
a patent for a living organism. Prior to the Chakrabartydecision, the PTO
refused to issue patents for living organisms, independent of their use, but
would issue patents for compositions containing living things, such as wastedisposal systems containing bacteria.3" Many patent application denials have
been predicated on the grounds that "products of nature" are not patentable.
A. PRODUCTS OF NATURE

It is well established in patent law that products of nature are not
patentable; rather, patentable inventions are those devised only by humans. 8
The policy underlying this doctrine seems to be that a product of nature does
not satisfy the novelty requirement of the Patent Act because it existed
before its "discovery" by the patentee. 9 The key distinction is between the
act of invention and the act of discovery. A patent rewards an inventor for
the fruits of his labor, not for a mere discovery of something that already
existed in nature.
An often-cited opinion regarding the product of nature doctrine is the
1948 United States Supreme Court decision in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co.4" In Funk Bros. Seed Co., the patentee claimed a patent for a
mixture of bacterial strains which were used to infect plant roots, thereby
aiding the plant in the fixing of nitrogen.4 1 The Court denied the application

'7 See, e.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding
valid a patent for a septic tank utilizing bacteria); Union Solvents Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 61 F.2d
1041 (3d Cir. 1932) (recognizing infringement of patent for a bacterial process utilized in the synthesis of
alcohol); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (recognizing patent for
septic tank utilizing bacteria). These cases demonstrate that the PTO has not had qualms with granting
patents for processes that utilize a living organism. However, these patents did not grant a property right
in the organism itself, but merely in the process which utilized it.
8 See General Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928) ("If it is a natural
thing then clearly, even if [the patentee] was the first to uncover it and bring it into view, he cannot have
a patent for it because a patent cannot be awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature. . ."); see also
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) (denying a patent for cork); cf
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887) (denying patent for seashells that have not been
changed).
" Seegenerally Karl Bozicevic,Distinguishing'ProductsoNature"from ProductsDerivedfromNature,
69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.SoC'Y 415 (1987) (distinguishing unpatentable products of nature from
patentable materials of natural origin).
'0 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (1948).
41 L at 129-30.
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because the effect of the mixture was merely the combined effect that the
individual strains of bacteria would have had on their own.42
It is difficult to determine why the Court denied the patent other than
simply by finding that the strains were products of nature and the
combination did not substantially change their character. Was the decision
based on the determination that these products of nature lacked novelty?
Or, was the patent denied
because the strains, being merely products of
43
nature, were obvious?

However unclear the basis for the Court's decision, it is clear that a
product of nature is not patentable subject matter absent some degree of
refinement or improvement by the patentee. This requirement is relevant
in the field of biotechnology because "[b]iotechnicians alter, modify, assist,
or manipulate nature. Biotechnicians are not inventors of organisms or
genes..."44
B. PLANT PATENTS

Throughout the early twentieth century, the PTO commonly rejected
the patent applications of horticulturists for their botanical inventions.4" In
response, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Protection Act of 1952.46 The
Act guarantees patent protection for anyone who "invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant."4" Although the
Act protected
plant breeders, it did not help the creators of flowers, seeds, or
4
fruit.

In order to protect creators' rights in sexually-reproducing plants,
Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. 4" This Act

42 I

4 IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND LAW S 3.01, at 3-4 (1987).

Ned Hettinger, PatentingLife" Biotechnology, Intellectual Property,and EnvironmentalEthics, 22
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 267, 289 (1995).

4 John M. Czarnetsky, Note, AlteringNature'sBluerintsforProfit:PatentingMulticellularAnimals,
74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (1988).
46

35 U.S.C. SS 161-164 (1994) (originally enacted as Plant Protection Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804

(1952)).
4

35 U.S.C. S 161 (1994).

' Czarnetsky, supra note 45, at 1350.
4' 7 U.S.C. SS 2321-2583 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
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extended patent protection to sexually-reproduced plants, thus protecting
creators of flowers, seeds, and fruits."
C. INREMERAT

Following the adoption of the Plant Patent Protection Act and of the
Plant Variety Protection Act, it appeared that the patent system was poised
to provide protection for inventions that benefited society, regardless of the
form of the invention. However, there still existed a barrier against
inventors and engineers of single-celled and multicellular animal life forms.
In Merat, an inventor applied for a patent on a dwarf chicken."1 The
chicken was not the product of genetic engineering but rather was the result
of controlled breeding.52 The patent examiner rejected the application
because the chicken was a product of nature produced by controlled
propagation, and not a "manufacture"; it was, therefore, not patentable
under section 101 of the Patent Act. The Board agreed. 3 The C.C.P.A.
affirmed the Board's decision but on other grounds." Thus, the question of
whether the dwarf chicken was patentable subject matter under section 101
remained unanswered.
D. INREBERGY

While in Merat the C.C.P.A. left the question of the patentability of the
dwarf chicken a mystery, two years later it expressed an opinion on whether
microorganisms which were not products of nature were patentable subject
matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.
In Bergy 5 an inventor developed an original method for cultivating the
previously-known antibiotic lincomycin B. In the process of this
development, Bergy discovered a previously-unknown microorganism which
proved useful in the production of the antibiotic, namely a pure culture of
56
streptomyces vellosus.

s' In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 471 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
2
53

d at 1391.
Id

Id at 1396 (rejecting patent because it failed to distinctly claim the subject matter of the patent).
ss In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
s Id at 967.
'4
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The PTO's patent examiner allowed all of Bergy's process claims for the
production of the new microorganism.17 However, the patent examiner
rejected Bergy's claim to the microorganism itself on the ground that
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act did not include
products of nature."8 The patent applicants had relied on the premise that a
pure product may be patentable even when it is found in nature in an impure
form. 9 The PTO disagreed, relying on Funk Bros. Seed Co.' to distinguish
6icroorganisms.1
between pure chemicals and pure
The applicants appealed to the Board, which held that living organisms
did not fall within patentable subject matter under the patent statute.62
Upon further appeal, the C.C.P.A. decided that non-naturally occurring
This is of great
microorganisms were patentable subject matter. 63
claim for a living
that
Bergy's
importance, as the court had previously found
organism was without legal significance.'
E. DIAMOND V. CHAKRABAR TY
65
A similar question to that in Bergy was presented in In re Chakrabarty.
Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, sought to patent a non-naturally
occurring single-celled microorganism which had been genetically engineered
to biologically decompose and control oil spills. 66 The bacterium was created
through the introduction of new genetic material into a living organism.67

57

Id

~'Id

s ExparteBergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 82 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1976).
" Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (1948).
61 ExparteBergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82.
" Id

at 79.

See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 975, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 373 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (reasoning that
the microorganism was not found in nature but rather was man-made in a laboratory).
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 350 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
65 In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id at 41.
' Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 n.2, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 195 n.2 (1980). The
Chakrabarty microorganism broke down several components of crude oil simultaneously, thereby
creating a faster and more efficient method for controlling spills than previous biological methods.
6
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The PTO's patent examiner allowed the claims for products and processes
involving the bacteria" but rejected the claim for the bacterium itself.6 9 The
rejection was based on the grounds that (1) the invention was a living
organism and (2) the invention was a product of nature. The Board upheld
the application denial, but in doing so it rejected the examiner's "product of
nature" rationale. 7" The applicants appealed the denial to the C.C.P.A.,
which reversed the Board's decision. 7 ' In doing so, the C.C.P.A. relied
primarily on its Bergy decision. 2
Following the C.C.P.A. decision in Chakrabarty, its previous Bergy
decision was vacated and remanded for reconsideration by the United States
Supreme Court73 in light of its decision in Parker v. Flook.74 The Flook
decision involved a patent application for a computer algorithm which was
held to fall outside patentable subject matter because it embodied "a formula
or law of nature.""5 Therefore, the C.C.P.A. was again required to decide
both cases (Bergy and Chakrabarty), this time consolidating them into one
dispute. 6 Just as it had done before, the C.C.P.A. decided in favor of both
Bergy and Chakrabarty. In doing so, it disregarded Flook because neither of
the cases at bar involved an algorithm, formula, or law of nature."7
Finally, in 1980 the United States Supreme Court granted Cbakrabarty
7" The Supreme Court held for Chakrabarty, finding that a live,
certiorari.

See id at 305-06 (noting the three types of claims as (1) process claims for the technique of
generating the bacteria, (2) claims for an inoculum including a carrier substance floating on the water and
the bacteria, and (3) claims to the bacteria itself).
69

Id

70 In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72, 74 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

1, Id at 43.
n See In reBergy, 563 F.2d 1031,1038,195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 350-51 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding the
validity of a patent claim is not dependent on the fact that the claimed microorganisms are alive). At least
one commentator has criticized the C.C.P.A.'s strict reliance on In re Bergy because the two cases are easily
distinguishable. Bergy's claim involved a biologically pure culture of a native organism, while
Chakrabarty's claim involved a recombinant organism. See Burk, supra note 1, at 31.
"' Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (1978).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
"s Id at 589-92. The Court held that a mathematical algorithm should be analyzed according to the
Funk Bros. Seed Co. rationale. It should be assumed that the claimed mathematical formula was already
well-known and therefore any subsequent application of the formula should not be patentable. Id at 594.
But see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 9 n.12 (1981) (rejecting the
government's analysis that an algorithm which employed a mathematical law should be assumed to be in
the prior art).
76 In re Chakrabarty, 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
' Id at 965-66.
"' Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
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man-made microorganism is patentable subject matter.7 9 The Court focused
its inquiry on whether Chakrabarty's microorganism was a nonpatentable,
naturally-occurring phenomenon or a patentable "manufacture" or
"composition of matter."80
The Court determined that "Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope,"81 and that patentable subject matter
was to" 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' "82 However,
the Court qualified this statement by opining that Congress did not intend
section 101 to cover every discovery and that "laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable.8 3 The Court proceeded
to distinguish the Chakrabarty bacterium from the aforementioned
unpatentable categories by labeling it as "markedly different" from any
microorganism found in nature and as having "significant utility."84 Thus,
Chakrabarty's "discovery [was] not nature's handiwork, but his own;
accordingly it [was] patentable subject matter under [section] 101. " "s The
Court distinguished this situation from that in Funk Bros. Seed Co., where the
bacterial mixture claimed was made up of bacteria found in nature, used for
86
their natural characteristics.
A majority of the Court rejected the PTO's argument that Congress had
impliedly excluded living organisms from patentability by enacting both the
Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act.8" These statutes
provided patent protection only for specific living organisms. The PTO
argued that these Acts would not have been enacted if such exceptions for
living organisms under the Patent Act were unnecessary. The Court

" Id at 318. It is ironic that the first microorganism to be granted a patent was Chakrabarty's oileating bacterium. Ecological groups were among the fiercest critics against the granting of patents for
living organisms. The fear was that these -new" scientifically-altered organisms would disrupt the fragile
ecological chain. Clearly, however, these same ecological groups loved the idea of a better aid in the fight
against oil spills. Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve
ConstitutionalProtection?,15 AM.J.L. & MED. 461, 463 (1989).
8 Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 307, 206 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 196 (citing 35 U.S.C. S 101). Note that the
Court did not consider the issues of novelty under 35 U.S.C. S 102 or non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
S103. Id at 307 n.5.
ld at 308.
i1
82 d at 309 (quoting S.REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
SS Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980).
84 Id. at 310.
's
86

Id.

Id.
szId. at 310-11.
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examined the appropriate legislative history and determined that Congress
intended to distinguish products of nature, both living and non-living, from
man-made inventions."8 Thus, neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant
Variety Protection Act precluded the patenting of Chakrabarty's
microorganism as the result of "human ingenuity and research." 9
The Supreme Court also rejected the PTO's argument that
microorganisms are not patentable until Congress expressly authorizes such
protection.' The Court held that a "rule that unanticipated inventions are
without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law
that anticipation undermines patentability."'" Further, "Congress employed
broad general language in drafting [section] 101 precisely because inventions
are often unforeseeable."92 This liberal statutory interpretation is extremely
favorable to inventors who wish to patent multicellular organisms.
The granting of Chakrabarty's patent was a crucial event in the evolution
of patent law. The Supreme Court's "anything under the sun" language
seemed to expressly include human-based inventions. The next step toward
the patenting of a human based-invention, namely the PTO's acceptance of
the validity of a patent on a multicellular animal, seemed inevitable.
F. EXPARTEALLEN

Although the Chakrabarty decision did' not expressly give an open
invitation to patent any type of life form, the case opened the door for
animal patenting. The decision immediately spurred the growth of the
biotechnology industry in the 1980s because it provided prospective
inventors with hope that their work could be protected by the patent
system. However, the PTO was slow to follow the rationale of Chakrabarty

" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198-99 (1980). The Court
went on to state that bacteria were excluded from the Plant Variety Protection Act because Congress
approved of either an earlier case which held that bacteria are not plants under the Plant Patent Act or
prior patents issued for bacteria. Id at 313-14.
"' Id. at 313; seealsoExparteHibberd,227U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat App. &Int. 1985) (expanding
the Chakrabarty decision to allow the patenting of a maize seed, plant, and tissue culture). In Hibberd,the
patent examiner contended that the passages of the Plant Protection Act and the Plant Variety Protection
Act "implicitly excluded protection of these plants under Section 101." ld at 445. The Board rejected the
contention, relying heavily on Chakrabarty. Id
o Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 199-200 (1980).
'1 Id. at 316.
92 Id.
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and failed to grant patents for genetically-engineered, multicellular products.
The persistent denial of patents for multicellular life forms, like the earlier
denials for plants, deprived many researchers of the fruits of their labor.
In 1987, ExparteAllen9 tested the limits of the "anything under the sun"
language of the Chakrabartydecision. The patent application was for Allen's
method of inducing polyploidy9 4 in oysters and, more importantly, for the
resulting oyster produced by the process." The PTO rejected the patent on
the basis that "the animal produced by the method claimed is 'controlled by
laws of nature and not a manufacture of man that is patentable." 96
Allen appealed the PTO's decision to the Board, which ultimately
rejected the application, but on different grounds than the PTO examiner.
The Board disagreed with the patent examiner's conclusion that the oysters
were not patentable solely because they were living organisms. 97 Instead, the
Board rationalized its upholding of the PTO's denial by noting that
polyploidy had been produced previously in another oyster species.98 The
patent therefore failed the nonobviousness requirement of section 103 of the
Patent Act."
While the decision was not good for Allen personally, it was a good sign
for his industry. In the course of affirming the denial of the application, the
Board restated the Chakrabarty reasoning that the patent laws should be
given a wide scope, which again would seem to include human-based
inventions. Although the patent was not granted, the Board clearly endorsed
the Supreme Court's view that section 101 allowed patents to be issued for
"anything under the sun that is made by man.""0 0
3 ExparteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987).

The inventor employed a procedure which created an alteration in the number of chromosomes
in oyster eggs by exposing fertilized eggs to pressure for a given period of time. lat at 1426. Polyploidy
refers to an organism with more than two sets of chromosomes. Robert B. Kambic, Note, Hinderingthe
Progressof Science: The Use of the Patent System to Regulate Research on Genetically Altered Animals, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 453 n.115 (1988). The utility of the method of creating polyploidy in oysters
is that it makes them sterile, which both increases their size and makes them edible all year long. Id. at
453 n.116.
9' ExparteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425-26.
Id. at 1426 (quoting the patent examiner).
" Id. at 1426-27 ("The issue, in our view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is
patentable under section 101 is simply whether that subject matter is made by man. If the claimed subject
matter occurs naturally, it is not patentable subject matter under section 101.").
98 I at 1427.
'"

Id
o ExparteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309,
206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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G. THE

1987 ANNOUNCEMENT & ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSEFUND V. QUIGG

On April 7, 1987, a mere four days after the Board's decision in Allen, the
PTO announced that it would begin to accept patents on "nonnaturally
occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals." 1 '
The announcement specified that, in order to be patentable, an animal must
be "given a new form, quality, properties or combination not present in the
original article existing in nature in accordance with existing law."0 2 The
announcement, apparently discounting the Supreme Court's language in
Chakrabarty, explicitly stated that any organism including human genetic
material should be identified as non-human in order to be accepted because
human beings are still not patentable subject matter.0 3
Immediately following the 1987 announcement, various animal rights
groups, farmers, and animal husbanders sued the PTO in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California."°' Because the PTO's
statement was neither made with the aid of any public comment nor
published in the Federal Register,' the plaintiffs claimed that the rule
announced in the statement was promulgated in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act and exceeded the PTO's statutory
authority."°
The PTO moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs
lacked standing and (2) the cause of action failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.0 7 The district court assumed without deciding that
the plaintiffs had the requisite standing, but it dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the PTO's "new" rule was not really new at all, but merely
synthesized prior decisions without undue expansion.'
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the district court's decision was affirmed on the alternative ground that the

" Quigg, supra note 4, at 328.
Id
103 Id
102

10 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (N.D. Cal.

1989).
10

Id at 729.

106 Id
107 Id

"I Id at 732.
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plaintiffs lacked standing." 9 The court held that the plaintiffs had not
satisfied the constitutional requirement that the party seeking review must
have suffered personal injury in fact."'
The plaintiffs claimed that the injury in fact was increased cruelty to
animals due to the PTO announcement. Although relying on the lack of a
valid injury in fact in its decision, the court also reached the issue of whether
there was causation between the actions of the PTO and the claimed injury

to the plaintiffs."' The court noted that the action of an independent third
party would have to occur before there could be increased cruelty to animals.
In essence, the court refused to equate the issuance of animal patents with the
violation of animal cruelty laws."'
H. THE HARVARD MOUSE

In April 1988, the PTO granted the first patent for a multicellular
organism."' The patent was issued to Harvard University, whose faculty
had genetically engineered a mouse which was particularly susceptible to
cancer."14

Nearly 200 years after the United States Constitution purported to
promote science and the useful arts by offering limited protection for
inventions, biotechnologists engaged in the genetic engineering of animals
were finally allowed to benefit from the patent system. It took not only the
ingenuity of these biotechnologists but also the intervention of the United
States Supreme Court to overcome the conservative stance of the PTO
regarding the patenting of living organisms. The PTO was forced, by both
the Supreme Court and the Board, to recognize the patentability of a bacteria
109 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,925,18 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) 1677,1681-82 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
110Id. at 936.
...
Id. at 936-37.
112Id. at 937.

...U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988) (granting patent on a transgenic non-human mammal).
114 The "Harvard Mouse" patent covered a mouse which had been genetically altered so that it
would
be born with cancer in its cells. As a result, its progeny are exceptionally susceptible to the development
of tumors when exposed to cancer-causing agents. The mice can be used by scientists as a method for
testing various chemicals in order to determine their propensity to cause cancer. Patentand Trademark
Office IssuesFirstAnimalPatent,DAiLY REP. FOR EXEcUTIVES (Apr. 13, 1988); seealso Michael B. Landau,
MulticellularVertebrateMammalsas "PatentableSubjectMatter"Under35
U.S. C S 101:PromotionofScience
and the Useful Arts or an Open Invitationfor Abuse?, 97 DIcK. L. REv. 203, 213 (1993) (describing the
Harvard Mouse patent).
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and eventually a multicellular animal. However, on two separate occasions,
the PTO has publicly limited the language of the United States Supreme
Court which would otherwise appear to support the patentability of humanbased inventions.
IV. THE PTO's Two ANNOUNCEMENTS

On April 7, 1987 the PTO released the following statement regarding Ex
parteAllen:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers
nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular
living organisms, including animals, to be patentable
subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101.
The Board's decision does not affect the principle and
practice that products found in nature will not be
considered to be patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. 101 and/or 102. An article of manufacture or
composition of matter occurring in nature will not be
considered patentable unless given a new form,
quality, properties or combination not present in the
original article... A claim directed to or including
within its scope a human being will not be considered
to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101.
The grant of a... property right in a human being is
prohibited by the Constitution. Accordingly, it is
suggested that any claim.. . which would include a
human being within its scope include the limitation
"non-human" to avoid this ground of rejection.115
The 1987 statement erects a bar to the patenting of human-based
of patent law and (2) its
inventions because of (1) the PTO's interpretation
6
Amendment."
Thirteenth
the
on
reliance

DonaldJ. Quigg, Statement by Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
in Patent and Trademark Office Notice: Animals-Patentability,1077 OFICIcAL GAZETTE U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. 24 (1987).
...
See id. (discussing the patentability of human-based inventions).
"'
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A. THE PTO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PATENT ACT

The PTO's statement does not provide any explanation as to why
human-based inventions do not meet the "patentability" requirement. The
PTO at one point distinguished an unpatentable "product of nature" from
an article of manufacture or composition of matter occurring in nature that
is patentable-the key distinction being that the matter must be "given a new
form, quality, properties or combination not present in the original
article."" 7 At the same time, the PTO announced that a claim directed to or
including a human being will not be considered patentable."'
These two positions, taken together, seem inconsistent. What about a
human embryo that is given a new form, quality, properties or combination
not present in any embryo ever produced in nature? Certainly the ability to
create a chimera consisting of two different or closely-related species
constitutes a combination not present in the original article existing in
nature. A chimera would plainly fall within the requirements of both the
1987 PTO statement and the Patent Act. Under current patent laws, a
genetically-engineered chimera should be treated no differently than a
genetically-engineered plant or mouse. It would be a man-made composition
of matter not existing in nature before the invention. The PTO's statement
regarding human creations concerns a subject that can and should only be
pronounced by Congress."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's definition of the patentability of
living creatures in Chakrabartycontains no qualification concerning humanbased inventions; it simply states that anything "under the sun" that is manmade is patentable (presuming that it is novel, nonobvious, and has some
utility). 2 0 Although the Court was considering the patentability of bacteria,
there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that human-based inventions are
to be excluded from patent protection. Therefore, the PTO's glib
announcement that inventions involving humans do not meet the standards
for patentability under section 101 is not supported by the Patent Act and
is simply a unilateral reinterpretation of the law.
117

Id

"'Id

n Ironically, the PTO cites, as one of its reasons for denying patent protection for human-based
inventions, constitutional concerns via the Thirteenth Amendment while at the same time doing an end
run around separation of powers, bicameralism, and the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7.
1'0 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

It is widely presumed that the PTO's reference to a constitutional
prohibition against owning a property right in a human being is grounded
in the Thirteenth Amendment, preventing the involuntary servitude of men
and women. 2 '
Even assuming that a human-based invention is considered to be
"sufficiently human" to fall within the Thirteenth Amendment, in order for
there to be a violation of the amendment, there must also be some degree of
involuntary servitude involved. Simply because a patentee owns a patent
does not necessarily mean that he owns the invention. The grant of a patent
gives him property rights in the patent, not in the invention itself.' Unlike
slavery, where a person is the property of an owner, a patentee of a humanbased invention does not own the product. A biotechnologist who holds a
patent in a human-based invention can do as he pleases with the patent rights
without controlling the resulting invention itself, in no way violating the
Thirteenth Amendment.
An additional problem created by the PTO's reliance on the Thirteenth
Amendment is the fact that the PTO is an administrative agency of the
executive branch of the federal government, which lacks the authority to
make decisions regarding fundamental constitutional rights. 2 ' Certainly
freedom from slavery is such a fundamental constitutional right. Therefore,
regardless of its statement, it is quite unlikely that the federal courts would
uphold a patent examiner's denial of patent protection for a human-based
invention based solely on the Thirteenth Amendment.
The PTO's 1987 announcement that it would not grant patents for
human-based inventions carelessly relied on its interpretation of both the
Patent Act and the Thirteenth Amendment. The PTO's reliance on the
Constitution is dubious at best and an unconstitutional exercise of
administrative power at worst. As for its interpretation (or lack thereof) of

121U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, S 1.

An initial issue presented by providing a chimera with

constitutional protection is whether such a creature is a "person" under the Constitution.
" SeeKevinD. DeBre, Note, PatentsonPeopleandtheU.S. Constitution:CreatingSlaves or Enslaving
Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221,224 nn.15 & 16 (1989) (citing congressional testimony of Jeremy
Rifkin).
123 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (holding that the refusal of an administrative
agency to issue a passport to a communist was an unconstitutional exercise of administrative power).
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the Patent Act, the PTO provides no justifications for its presumption that
human-based inventions are not patentable subject matter.
C. THE PTO'S 1998 ANNOUNCEMENT

This part will discuss whether the PTO's 1998 announcement has shifted
its stance against the patentability of human-based inventions from an
assertion apparently drafted quickly and carelessly'24 to a statement more
grounded in the law.
On April 2, 1998 the PTO issued a media advisory allegedly concerning
a joint patent application for a human-based invention by Stewart Newman
and Jeremy Rifkin.125 The announcement stated that "[i]t is the position of
the PTO that inventions directed to human/non-human chimera could,
under certain circumstances, not be patentable because, among other things,
they would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects of the utility
requirement."126
The PTO also stated that it "will not, [therefore], issue a patent for an
invention of incredible or specious utility or for inventions whose utilization
is not adequately disclosed in the application."2 Additionally, the PTO
pointed out that courts have interpreted the patent law's utility requirements
to exclude inventions deemed to be "injurious to the well being, good policy,
or good morals of society. "128
The PTO's 1998 statement can be viewed as both a retreat from and an
expansion of its 1987 statement. It seems as though the PTO has wisely
backed away from its reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, which was a
shaky legal basis for the denial of patents for human-based inventions.
Instead of citing the public policy and morality aspects of the utility
requirement, the PTO could have simply declared that granting a patent for
the Newman/Rifkin chimera would constitute involuntary and
unconstitutional servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the

124The 1987 announcement was made only four days after the Board's decision in ExparteAllen.
12. Quigg, supra note 9.
126 Id. at 17.
127IL
'2 Id at 17 (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (Story, J.) and

Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Product-und Mktg. Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552,20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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PTO shifted the focus of its stance away from
a constitutional basis and
129
toward an expansion of its statutory reading.
In its 1987 statement the PTO offered no explanation as to why it
considered unpatentable any invention directed to or including humans. 3
However, the latest statement provides a basis for the policy that at least
certain human-based inventions3 are not patentable subject matter under
section 101. In what could be viewed as an effort to legitimize its 1987
pronouncement against claims directed to, or including within their scope,
a human being, the PTO quoted the language of Justice Story in the 1817
32
case of Lowell v. Lewis.1

In Lowell, Story made the following statement in the course of explaining
the utility requirement:
All that the law requires is, that the invention should
not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society. The word
"useful," therefore is incorporated into the act in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For
instance, a new invention to poison people, or to
promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination, is not a patentable invention. But if the
invention steers wide of these objections, whether it
be more or less useful is a circumstance very material

Quigg, supra note 9, at 17.
130Quigg, supra note 115, at 24.
1
The PTO's 1998 announcement is presumably specifically directed at a single patent application.
1

Quigg, supra note 9. The announcement does not necessarily declare that the patent will not be granted.
It merely states that such an application may not satisfy the morality and public policy aspects of the
utility requirement. However, this Note addresses the statement as if it will be applied "across-the-board"
to all human-based inventions just as the 1987 statement applied. This approach will be taken because (1)
the 1998 statement provides a useful explanation of the unspecified statutory basis underlying the 1987
statement, (2) such a basis could presumably be used to deny patents to all human-based inventions, and
(3) as this Note demonstrates, the PTO has shown such a desire to deny patents for all human-based
inventions.
1.2 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (involving alleged patent
infringement of a water pump). Seealso Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37,37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217)
(defining a useful invention as "one as may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in
contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of
society").
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to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance
to the public.33
Story's comments raise a few questions with respect to human-based
inventions: (1) is his recognition of a morality/public policy aspect of the
utility requirement a proper judicial interpretation of the patent laws, (2)
how often has this theory been asserted to deny patents, and (3) even
assuming arguendo that Story's insertion of a morality standard into the
utility requirement of section 101 is a proper "interpretation" of the Act,
should it be used to deny patent protection for human-based inventions,
including the Newman/Rifkin chimera?
1. Story's Interpretationofthe Utility Requirement. The three commonly
recited requirements for patentability are novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness.'34 However, the Constitution only specifically mentions
utility in the form of the promotion of the "useful Arts." 3 ' Despite its
obvious importance, no congressional statute has gone very far in defining
either the term "utility" or what is "useful." 36 Therefore, it has been left
predominantly to the judicial branch to fashion the standard for utility.
Story's comments in Lowell were not his first regarding the utility
standard. In 1817, Story made a pronouncement that became widely known
as the "Story view of utility."1 3 7 The Story view was that "[t]he law ...does
not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of
use, and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not
discountenance or prohibit."'38 While the "Story view of utility" had its time
in the spotlight, the United States Supreme Court rejected its logic in 1966.139

...Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. The PTO also cited Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Product-und Mktg.
Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This case, dealing with
patentability of a rodless piston-cylinder, cited Story's comments with approval. Id at 1553. Ironically,
neither of the courts in the cases cited by the PTO actually denied the patent application for the particular
invention in question.
"' 35 U.S.C. S 101-103 (1994 & Supp. 1997).

CONST. art. I, S 8,cl.
8.
See 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful.. ."); see also 35
U.S.C. S 112 (1994) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it...").
137Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass 1817) (No. 1,217).
... U.S.
136

138ld
139

Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966).
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In Brenner v. Manson, the Court specifically looked to the degree of
utility of the patent application and determined that utility was lacking. 4 '
In the course of its opinion, the Court stated that there could be no patent
protection for processes "which either [have] no known use or [are] useful
only in the sense that [they] may be an object of scientific research."'4 1
While Brenner was an instant and obvious departure from Story's view of the
necessary degree of utility, the departure from the morality/public policy
aspect of the utility requirement has been more of a gradual process.
2. Prior Use of the Morality/PublicPolicy Standard. Story's comments
regarding inventions which are "injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of society"1 2 were used sparingly in the nineteenth century.
For example, this doctrine of "social utility" was occasionally invoked in
order to deny patents on gambling devices and products or processes useful
only for perpetrating frauds.143 The initial nineteenth century cases which
invoked the doctrine of social utility denied the patentable utility of
inventions that could be used for gambling or fraud along with other less
morally repulsive purposes. 1" However, the use of the doctrine was quickly
narrowed to inventions with no use other than gambling.'
While the doctrine may have had some support soon after Story's
comments, courts have not invoked the doctrine in decades. As a matter of
fact, the PTO has since upheld an invention even though it was used solely
for gambling purposes. 1" In modern times, it seems issues of morality and

140 Id

at 534-35.
at 535.
142 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
14 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, S 4.031] (1999); see generally Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual
Propertyin HigherLife Forms:The PatentSystem and ControversialTechnologies, 47 MD. L. REV.
1051, 1062 (1988) (arguing that the morality standard has proven to be a difficult test and that the PTO
should not address such concerns).
144See, e.g., Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (denying a patent for a coin return
device simply because it was widely used on slot machines); National Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40
F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1889) (denying a patent for a miniature race horse course because it was used solely
for the purposes of gambling). For cases involving fraudulent inventions, see, for example, Klein v.
Russell, 86 U.S. 433, 445 (1873) (holding that patents should be denied for any processes that cannot be
made useful for any honest purpose and which result in perpetrating a fraud upon the public); Rickard
v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1900) (denying patent for a process which artificially produced
spots on tobacco leaves, making them resemble a higher grade of tobacco without substantively improving
the tobacco).
14sSee Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (stating that an invention lacks patentable
utility only if it is incapable of serving any beneficial end).
1 Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1977).
141 Id
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of public policy are irrelevant in the determination of whether or not an
invention has patentable utility. A patent covering a police radar detector
has been held not lacking in patentable utility even though its sole purpose
is the circumvention of law enforcement. 14 7 Today few question whether
patent grants for inventions as lethal as the Gatling gun,'48 as
environmentally unsound as polystyrene-foam fast food packaging, 4 9 or as
unhealthy as a cigarette-making devices are beneficial to society or in
keeping with sound patent policy.
The determination of what constitutes an immoral invention is a
subjective one and thus changes from generation to generation. Therefore,
it should be no surprise that the use of the doctrine of social utility in
denying patents has, over the years, fallen out of favor with the federal
courts, if not with the PTO. It appears that today's conservative Supreme
Court would be hesitant to invoke a subjective doctrine which has not seen
much use over the last century. In an effort to legitimize its stance against
granting patent protection to biotechnologists for human-based inventions,
the PTO, in its 1998 announcement, has relied upon a dying doctrine. The
1987 statement lacked constitutional logic while devoid of any statutory
analysis. After eleven years and one more announcement, the PTO has gone
no further toward offering a rational basis for its wholesale denial of humanbased patents in the face of Supreme Court language arguably holding
otherwise.
3. Application to Human-BasedInventions. Even assuming arguendo that
Story's insertion of a morality standard into the utility requirement of
section 101 is a proper interpretation of the Patent Act, it remains to be
decided whether human-based inventions, including the Newman/Rifkin
chimera, are "injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of
society."1' The recent granting of a patent for the Harvard Mouse sparked
a debate among commentators as to whether these patents should be issued
at all."52 As science steadily marches toward more advanced technology

...Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
14S U.S. Pat. No. 36,836 (Nov. 4, 1862).
145 U.S. Pat. No. 4,132,344 Gan. 2, 1979).
U.S. Pat. No. 5,012,823 (May 7, 1991).
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
..
2 See generally Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28
"s
1

JURIEiTRICSJ. 399,410-24 (1988) (recognizing concerns such as increased animal suffering); Merges, supra
note 143, at 1057-58 (noting the possibility of immediate direct or indirect ecological disasters and a
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involving humans, e.g., cloning, the debate has spread into the arena of
human-based inventions.
One of the major arguments in support of animal patents has traditionally
been their significant role in the field of medical research. Rightly or
wrongly, society seems to have accepted the fact that animals are bred, tested,
and now actually genetically engineered for the sole purpose of saving
human lives. Most people place human life on a level above that of the
animal world, but what about a creature that is part human? Any argument
in favor of patent protection for human-based inventions must be supported
by the utility of the invention. It is difficult to envision many other uses of
such inventions other than those involving medical research."5 3 A strong
argument can be made that subjecting human hybrids to the pain and
suffering of medical research would be "injurious to. the well-being, good
policy, or good morals of society.""5 4
Another argument that the patenting of human-based inventions would
violate Story's morality requirement stems from the view that such creatures
should be afforded all of the constitutional rights of United States citizens.
Assuming that human-based inventions are "persons born or naturalized in
the United States, "155 they would be entitled to the protections provided by
the Constitution. The denial of a person's fundamental rights is against the
public policy of our nation. For this reason, the framers of the Constitution
included the Bill of Rights, which was later augmented by, most notably, the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Assuming for the purpose of
argument that the granting of a patent by the government constitutes state
action, the use of a person, in the form of a hybrid human, for medical
research or any other use not voluntarily chosen by the person could violate
that person's rights under substantive due process and the Equal Protection
clause of the Constitution." 6 Any violation of the Constitution which
would necessarily flow from the utility of an invention must certainly render

reduction in the gene pool).
153 But see DeBre, supra note 122, at 222 n.8 (citing J.B.S. Haldane, Biological Possibilities
for Human
Species in the Next Ten Thousand Years, in MAN AND His FUTURE 337, 354 (G. Wolstenholme ed. 1963)).
Dr. Haldane has suggested that genetic engineering could lead to humans with prehensile feet and no heels
who would be ideal astronauts.
"s Keep in mind that Story's test does not ask whether granting the patent itself would violate public
policy but rather whether the intended use of the invention/process would violate public policy.
...U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. See generally Rivard, supra note 13 (discussing whether transgenic
humanoid species would be considered "persons" under the Constitution).
156 Rivard, supra note 13, at 1441.
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that utility "injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of
"17
society. 1
The patenting of a human-based invention may well violate Justice
Story's public policy/morality aspect of the utility requirement. However,
this fact alone cannot justify a ban on the patenting of these inventions
because Story's requirement is a doctrine which is no longer embraced.
V. CONCLUSION

The PTO has a long history of reluctance in granting patent protection
for inventions and processes involving living organisms. In 1980 the United
States Supreme Court directed the PTO to grant a patent for the
Chakrabarty bacterium. The Court pronounced that patentable subject
matter was to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."1 5 8 By
1987 the Board had recognized that a multicellular animal made by man was
patentable subject matter.5 9 Finally, in 1988, the PTO for the first time
granted a patent for a genetically-engineered multicellular animal: the
Harvard Mouse.
Despite its recent acceptance of patent protection for animals and the
strong language of Chakrabarty,the PTO in 1987 declared that patent claims
directed to or including in their scope a human being would be denied. This
proscription was based on a vague reference to the Patent Act coupled with
a dubious reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment. In 1998 the PTO issued
another statement in which it retreated from its constitutional rationale
while explaining its statutory basis for denying patent protection for humanbased inventions.
The PTO's recent reliance on Justice Story's view of a morality/public
policy aspect of the utility requirement is flawed in two respects. First, it
assumes that any utility inherent in such an invention would necessarily
violate public policy. While the most readily apparent uses would seem to
violate the Constitution, thereby violating public policy, the PTO, as an
administrative agency, is in no position to make such decisions regarding
fundamental constitutional rights. Second, even assuming that any utility
derived from a human-based invention would violate public policy, Story's

17 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).

...Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980).
'59Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987).
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utility standard is a dead doctrine which had its time in the nineteenth
century. This century has seen the grant of patents for inventions and
processes whose only utility could be deemed injurious to the well-being of
society.
While the PTO may have valid concerns about the consequences of
granting patents for human-based inventions, none of its past or present
reasons for a wholesale denial are persuasive. Although there may be strong
arguments, both legal and ethical, against the patenting of a parallel
humanoid species, the PTO is not the organization to make such
determinations. Instead of relying on the PTO and ultimately the United
States Supreme Court to make ad hoc decisions concerning the
constitutionality of human-based inventions, Congress should step forward
to provide for or proscribe patent protection for these inventions. Such
legislative action would preclude any constitutional challenge to a patent
based on substantive due process or equal protection. Furthermore, it would
not be unprecedented for Congress to statutorily deny patent protection in
a certain field of technology. For example, the Atomic Energy Act provides
that "[n]o patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery
which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy in an atomic weapon." 1" But until Congress takes such affirmative
action or publicly refuses to do so, human-based inventions will remain
subject to the PTO's wholesale prohibition, no matter how misdirected it
may be.
JAMES P. DANIEL

"e Atomic Energy Act of 1954 S 152,42 U.S.C. S 2181(a) (1994).
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